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INTRODUCTION

In June 2018, Stephanie Wilkinson, owner of the Red Hen restaurant
in Virginia, asked White House Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders
to leave her restaurant.1 Wilkinson asked Sanders to leave because she
viewed the Trump administration as “inhumane and unethical,” lacking
“honesty . . . compassion, and cooperation.”2 Sanders left without a fuss,
but public support and outcry rained down on the restaurant both online
and at the restaurant’s location.3 Despite the public response, the Red Hen
was within its rights to deny Sanders service based on her political
affiliation.4 As a restaurant, the Red Hen is subject to public
accommodations laws.5 Generally, a business is a public accommodation
when it serves a public interest.6 Although public accommodations laws
vary among jurisdictions, they typically list classifications protected from

1. Whitney Filloon, The Red Hen Didn’t Break the Law When It Kicked Out
Sarah Huckabee Sanders, EATER (June 26, 2018), https://www.eater.com/2018/
6/26/17505512/red-hen-discrimination-laws-sarah-huckabee-sanders [https://per
ma.cc/5WW5-JLT8].
2. Id.
3. Avi Selk & Sarah Murray, The Owner of the Red Hen Explains Why She
Asked Sarah Huckabee Sanders to Leave, WASH. POST (June 25, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2018/06/23/why-a-small-town-restaur
ant-owner-asked-sarah-huckabee-sanders-to-leave-and-would-do-it-again/?utm_
term=.b1a5c5329952 [https://perma.cc/UK5D-KG5W].
4. Filloon, supra note 1.
5. Sonia Rao, Did the Red Hen Violate Sarah Huckabee Sanders’s Rights
When It Kicked Her Out?, WASH. POST (June 25, 2018), https://www.washington
post.com/news/food/wp/2018/06/25/was-sarah-huckabee-sanders-denied-publicaccommodation-when-a-restaurant-kicked-her-out/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.
7217ad133493 [https://perma.cc/P7Z4-ACL6].
6. German All. Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U.S. 389, 408 (1914).
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discrimination within businesses that qualify as public accommodations.7
Political affiliation, or a person’s attachment or support of a political
party,8 is overwhelmingly absent from the lists of protected classes in most
public accommodations laws.9
In addition to political figures,10 private individuals can also face
political affiliation discrimination from public accommodations. For
example, when a family wearing Donald Trump shirts and hats walked up
to the service window at Cook Out in Virginia, an employee initially
denied them service.11 Although the fast food restaurant eventually took
the family’s order, the employees’ behavior made the family so
uncomfortable while waiting that they cancelled the order.12 Across the
country, after the confirmation of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brett
Kavanaugh, the University of Washington chapter of College Republicans
posted a Facebook event to celebrate at Shultzy’s Bar and Grill in Seattle.13
The bar, however, asked the group to find another venue “due to the
political nature” of their event.14 Despite the bar’s request, the Seattle
public accommodations law15—which protected discrimination based on
political affiliation—enabled the group to go forward with the event.16
Additionally, in 2019, a Michigan consulting firm challenged an Ann
Arbor ordinance that prohibited political affiliation discrimination in
public accommodations like their consulting firm for fear of “having a

7. Rao, supra note 5.
8. See Blodgett v. Univ. Club, 930 A.2d 210, 211 (D.C. 2007) (citing D.C.
CODE STAT. § 2:1401.02(25) (2001 & 2006 Supp.)); Lee Hargrave, The
Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REV. 1, 10
(1974) (defining “political ideas or affiliations” as referring to “basic rights to
freedom of beliefs and associations with respect to government”).
9. Rao, supra note 5.
10. For a discussion of public accommodations that chose to ban President
Donald Trump, see Matthew Sedacca, The Politics (and PR) of Restaurants
Banning Donald Trump, EATER (July 11, 2016), https://www.eater.com/2016/
7/11/12112598/donald-trump-banned-restaurant [https://perma.cc/4CQ4-24RC].
11. Wayne Covil, Trump Supporters Denied Service at Cook Out, WTVR
(June 13, 2016), https://wtvr.com/2016/06/13/trump-supporters-cook-out/ [https:
//perma.cc/7SPM-Y9VJ].
12. Id.
13. Jason Rantz, Rantz: Seattle Bar Tried to Deny Service to Republicans
Celebrating Kavanaugh, 770 KTTH (Oct. 8, 2018), http://mynorthwest.com/1139
400/seattle-bar-deny-college-republicans/ [https://perma.cc/LPF5-ZL8K].
14. Id.
15. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 14:06.030(B)(5) (2015).
16. Rantz, supra note 13.
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socialist client come to them.”17 Essentially, the consulting firm sought the
ability to refuse service to clients who held different political beliefs than
the conservative views of those who worked at the firm.18 These examples
demonstrate that incidents of political affiliation discrimination in public
accommodations can affect not only political figures but also private
individuals. Few United States jurisdictions, however, specifically provide
protection for these situations.19
Although Louisiana is not among the jurisdictions on this rather short
list, Louisiana law presents a particular potential to join the ranks.20 Article
I, section 12 of the Louisiana Constitution provides the state’s public
accommodations law.21 Section 12 lists race, religion, national ancestry,
age, sex, and physical condition as protected classifications.22 Contrarily,
Louisiana’s equal protection legislation, article I, section 3 also protects
political affiliation with language parallel to section 12.23 The similarities
between the two constitutional provisions—left untouched by decades of
cultural change—reveal that the Louisiana Constitution is poised for
17. Alex Swoyer, Conservative Consultants Sue over City’s Ban on Political
Discrimination, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.washingtontimes.com
/news/2019/aug/5/grant-strobl-jacob-chludzinski-fear-political-disc/ [https://per
ma.cc/CT87-ZDM8]; Ingrid Jacques, Jacques: Ann Arbor Shouldn’t Force
Promotion of Political Views, DETROIT NEWS (July 30, 2019), https://www
.detroitnews.com/story/opinion/columnists/ingrid-jacques/2019/07/31/jacques-ann
-arbors-anti-bias-law-overreach/1866555001/ [https://perma.cc/8H6D -BQSW].
18. See Swoyer, supra note 17.
19. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. STAT. § 2:1402.31 (2012); SEATTLE, WASH.,
MUN. CODE § 14:06.030(B)(5) (2015); V.I. CODE ANN. § 10:64(3) (2014); Rao,
supra note 5.
20. See generally LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 12.
21. LA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
22. The first portion of section 12 completely bars all discrimination from
public accommodations based on “race, religion, or national ancestry.” Id. This
Comment focuses on the second half of section 12, which prohibits “arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable discrimination based on age, sex, or physical
condition.” Id. When the remainder of this Comment references “protected” or
“enumerated” classifications, it is referring to the second half of section 12.
23. See id. §§ 3, 12. Sections 3 and 12 offer a more complete bar to
discrimination based on race and religion. See id. Section 12 adds national
ancestry to the stricter standard. Id. § 12. This Comment focuses on the
classifications subject to an intermediate standard of review, the language for
which is mirrored in both sections. Section 12 prohibits “arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable” discrimination based on age, sex, or physical condition, whereas
section 3 uses the same standard and also includes birth, culture, and political
affiliation. Id. §§ 3, 12.
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revision to prevent discrimination based on political affiliation in public
accommodations.
Sections 3 and 12 protect similar classes under shared standards of
judicial review.24 Both sections strictly bar discrimination based on race
and religion.25 Additionally, each section applies an intermediate standard
of review26 that prohibits “arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable
discrimination” of other articulated classifications.27 Due to the
similarities between the two sections and in light of recent events that
necessitate reconsideration,28 the Louisiana Legislature should read the
sections in pari materia.29 Furthermore, the Louisiana Legislature should
include political affiliation under section 12 protection, either through a
constitutional amendment or a new revised statute.30
Part I of this Comment provides background on public
accommodations legislation in the common law tradition and on the
federal level today. Also, Part I introduces the freedom of association
rights embodied in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
and presents the tension between public accommodations legislation and
the freedom to associate. Part II considers article I, sections 3 and 12 of
the Louisiana Constitution and identifies similarities in language,
application, and legislative intent between the two sections. Part II
proposes the addition of political affiliation as a section 12 protected
classification under the intermediate standard of scrutiny. Part III
24. Id. §§ 3, 12.
25. See id.
26. A standard of review can indicate two analytical approaches: (1) the
appellate court’s measure of deference toward the court below it; or (2) a method
to evaluate the constitutionality of a law. Standard of Review, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). This Comment utilizes the latter definition.
27. LA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (“In access to public areas, accommodations, and
facilities, every person shall be free from . . . arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable
discrimination based on age, sex, or physical condition.”); see id. § 3 (“No law
shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person
because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or
affiliations.”); Hargrave, supra note 8, at 40.
28. See supra notes 1–5, 10–18 and accompanying text.
29. In Latin, in pari materia means “in the same manner.” The approach
enables commentators to read similarly constructed statutes together to draw
conclusions through comparison. In Pari Materia, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014).
30. Although this claim begs another consideration—that is, whether to
include the other enumerated classifications in section 3 that do not appear in
section 12—this issue is beyond the scope of this Comment. This Comment
focuses solely on whether political affiliation should be added to section 12.
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compares Louisiana’s public accommodations legislation to developments
in other U.S. jurisdictions and considers Louisiana’s employment
regulations, which offer some protection for political affiliation. Part IV
contemplates the ramifications of adding political affiliation to section 12,
particularly in relation to freedom of association.31 Part V concludes by
addressing how the Louisiana Legislature can protect political affiliation
in public accommodations without running afoul of other rights.
I. BACKGROUND TO PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LAWS AND FIRST
AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
Before states imposed their own public accommodations legislation,
the federal government held the legislative power to construct public
accommodations laws.32 Initially, under United States common law, only
innkeepers and common carriers had a duty to serve their patrons—no
other public accommodations law existed.33 In the late 1800s, federal
courts began to recognize that the legislative power over public
accommodations had shifted to the states.34 Exercising their newly
recognized legislative ability, each state formed its own public
accommodations law, expanding the duty to serve from only inns and
common carriers to all businesses that serve the public, such as
restaurants.35 Now, state laws primarily govern public accommodations.
A. Defining Public Accommodations
Before the Civil War, federal law restricted public businesses from
discriminating against patrons by imposing a duty to serve.36 This duty
superseded public businesses’ right to refuse service.37 The common law
doctrine specifically distinguished between public and private businesses,
restricting public businesses’ right to refuse service simply because the

31. See James M. Gottry, Just Shoot Me: Public Accommodation AntiDiscrimination Laws Take Aim at First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 64
VAND. L. REV. 961 (2011).
32. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to
Public Accommodations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205 (2014).
33. Nance v. Mayflower Tavern, 150 P.2d 773, 776 (Utah 1944).
34. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515
U.S. 557, 571–72 (1995).
35. Nance, 150 P.2d at 776.
36. Bagenstos, supra note 32, at 1225.
37. Id.
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business acted within the public sphere.38 Federal law did not impose the
same duty to serve upon private businesses.39
Public accommodations are businesses that perform a “service which
has become of public interest.”40 In 1876, the United States Supreme Court
in Munn v. Illinois defined “public interest” as arising when one uses her
property in a way that affects the community at large.41 Once a person’s
property affects the community, she must “submit [that property] to be
controlled by the public for the common good.”42 Inns and common
carriers are the quintessential early examples of places of public
accommodation because they catered to travelers by providing places to
stay and transportation.43 By serving public interests, inns, common
carriers, and other similar businesses could only refuse service if they had
“good reason.”44 For example, innkeepers could refuse service to “drunks,
criminals, and diseased persons” for the safety, property, and health of the
innkeeper and her patrons.45 The “good reason” exception, however, only
applied when the court determined that the given reason outweighed the
general public interest in receiving the accommodation.46 This approach
to public accommodations implicitly preferred the public’s interest in
receiving service.47 This preference for the public interest was intertwined
with the idea of an innkeeper acting like a public servant.48 As years
passed, the concept of public accommodations grew to include more than
only innkeepers and common carriers, yet the public interest consideration
remained.
Legislation gradually expanded to include more types of businesses as
public accommodations, such as restaurants and hotels.49 As the states’
38. Private businesses held the right to refuse service, but legislation could
change this default rule. Madden v. Queens Cty. Jockey Club, 296 N.Y. 249, 253–
54 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1947).
39. See id. at 253.
40. German All. Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U.S. 389, 408 (1914).
41. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876). The term “public interest”
developed from property law. Id.
42. Id. at 126.
43. Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 275–76 (1963).
44. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 627 (1996); Lombard, 373 U.S. at 280.
45. Lombard, 373 U.S. at 280.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515
U.S. 557, 571 (1995).
49. Gottry, supra note 31, at 966 (citing President John F. Kennedy, Radio
and Television Report to the American People on Civil Rights (June 11, 1963),
available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKPOF/045/JFK
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legislative power over public accommodations increased, states drafted
their own statutes that extended regulations over the right to refuse service
to include private businesses in addition to public businesses.50 State
regulations, such as health inspections, price control, wage standards,
zoning restrictions, and safety requirements, pulled private businesses into
the public forum.51 For example, licensing requirements make private
businesses “instrumentalit[ies] of the State.”52 Through issuing licenses,
the state supervises a private business’s performance and allows the
business to serve the public.53 By also regulating private businesses, states
expanded the definition of places of public accommodation to include not
only public businesses, but also private enterprises like restaurants and
places of amusement.54 State authority, however, was not the initial mode
of control over public accommodations, even though states primarily
assert this legislative power today.
B. Public Accommodations Laws Historically: From General Duty to
Serve to Legislation Today
Power over public accommodations shifted from federal to primarily
state dominion over time, and today federal and state public
accommodations laws work together. Early United States Supreme Court
cases found that the Fourteenth Amendment provided federal legislative
authority regarding the duty to serve.55 The Supreme Court overturned this
precedent, however, in the Civil Rights Cases by holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not grant broad congressional power to
legislatively prohibit public accommodations from discriminating against
potential patrons.56 Although states had already begun to create their own
anti-discrimination public accommodations regulations prior to 1883, the
POF-045-005 [https://perma.cc/WC5V-K7B9]); see also Lombard, 373 U.S. at
279–83. Louisiana defines public accommodations in its Revised Statutes as any
establishment that: (1) “supplies goods or services to the general public”;
(2) “solicits or accepts the patronage or trade of the general public”; or (3) receives
direct or indirect support from government funds. LA. REV. STAT. § 51:2232(9)
(2014).
50. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515
U.S. 557, 571–72 (1995); Lombard, 373 U.S. at 279–82.
51. Lombard, 373 U.S. at 280–81.
52. Id. at 282–83.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 279–82.
55. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 627–28 (1996).
56. Id. (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883)).
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Civil Rights Cases fully cemented the shift from federal power to state
authority.57 The Court acknowledged that states had formulated their own
statutes preventing discrimination in public accommodations, indicating
an assignment of this power to the states.58 The control over public
accommodations legislation fully remained with the states until the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but states continue to retain broad
authority.59
Although states retain some public accommodations control, the Civil
Rights Act also regulates public accommodations discrimination by
seeking to eradicate race-based discrimination from public facilities.60 The
Civil Rights Act stemmed from President Kennedy’s request for Congress
to pass legislation requiring “equal service in places of public
accommodation,” such as restaurants, hotels, theaters, and retail stores.61
According to the Civil Rights Act, a place of public accommodation is any
business that affects interstate commerce or any business whose activities
the state supports.62 The Civil Rights Act lists several examples of public
accommodations, including inns, hotels, restaurants, and theaters.63 The
legislation also contains a catch-all provision for public accommodations,
including any business that is physically located on the same property as
any of the establishments listed within the Civil Rights Act, any business
57. In Louisiana cases from 1875 to 1876, the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled
that public accommodations could not unfairly infringe on individuals’ rights to
be free from unjust discrimination. John Devlin, Louisiana Associated General
Contractors: A Case Study in the Failure of a State Equality Guarantee to Further
the Transformative Vision of Civil Rights, 63 LA. L. REV. 887, 895 (2003). These
places of public accommodation included a coffeehouse, theater, and steamboat.
Id. at 895–96. In 1879, Louisiana instated the “Long Constitution” of 1879,
replacing the 1868 Constitution and deleting the explicit bar to public
accommodations discrimination. Id. at 896–97. Public accommodations
legislation returned in 1974 with the new Louisiana Constitution. Id. at 900–01.
The 1974 Constitution included freedom from discrimination in public
accommodations. Id.; see also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984).
58. Romer, 517 U.S. at 628; see also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 624.
59. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 625 (citing Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447
U.S. 74, 81–88 (1980)).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1964); see also Gottry, supra note 31, at 965–66
(citing Miller v. Amusement Enters., Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 352 (5th Cir. 1968)).
61. Gottry, supra note 31, at 966 (citing President John F. Kennedy, Radio
and Television Report to the American People on Civil Rights (June 11, 1963),
available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKPOF/045/JFK
POF-045-005 [https://perma.cc/WC5V-K7B9]).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b).
63. Id. § 2000a(b)(1)–(3); Gottry, supra note 31, at 966.
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that is an establishment housing any of the listed businesses, or any
business that presents itself as serving patrons of a listed establishment.64
To violate the Civil Rights Act, the public business must discriminate or
segregate based on “race, color, religion, or national origin.”65 The Civil
Rights Act continues to work in tandem with state legislation today.66
Other federal laws also apply to state regulation of public
accommodations, especially the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
C. Public Accommodations Laws and First Amendment Freedom of
Association
Although states possess broad authority to enact public
accommodations laws, remaining federal law limits this legislative
power.67 State public accommodations laws must not violate federal law,
such as the Civil Rights Act, the First Amendment, and the Fourteenth
Amendment.68 In particular, the First Amendment’s freedom of
association provision creates a demanding limitation upon restrictions on
discrimination within the public accommodations context.69
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution grants the
freedom of association “without regard” to the race, creed, religious ties,
or political affiliation of the group members in consideration.70 Freedom
to associate is the right to engage in activities that the First Amendment
protects, such as assembly or speech.71 States infringe upon the freedom
to associate when they impair individuals’ rights to choose with whom
they will participate as a group, regardless of whether the group goal is
political, religious, cultural, or otherwise.72 In addition, the freedom of
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(4).
65. Id. § 2000a(a).
66. See generally id.
67. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 658 (2000) (citing Hurley
v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 572
(1995)).
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. National Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 444–45 (1963); Dale, 530 U.S. at 647.
71. Case law also articulates a second flavor of freedom to associate: the
ability to enter into relationships with other individuals. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–18 (1984). This second articulation of the freedom of
association is beyond the scope of this Comment.
72. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618, 622.
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association includes a freedom not to associate.73 The freedom not to
associate allows a group to exclude other potential members.74
Infringement on the freedom to associate occurs when a government
regulation requires groups to include members that they would not
otherwise include.75 A freedom of association claim may arise when a
plaintiff alleges that a defendant organization—which must satisfy the
state’s definition of “public accommodation”—discriminated against
her.76 In such a case, the defendant organization members may then allege
that requiring the organization to include the plaintiff would violate the
members’ right to freedom of association under the First Amendment.77
Compelling state interests may override a violation of freedom of
association, rendering an infringement still constitutional and enabling a
plaintiff to join the group regardless.78 State interests are compelling when
the interests are unrelated to the constraint upon freedom of association
and when less suppressive means cannot achieve the legislative goals.79
For example, a statute barring discrimination will be upheld under
expressive freedom of association if the statute does not materially
interfere with ideas of a group.80 The group, however, is free to not
associate with a potential member if barring her presence prevents
significant interference with the existing members’ purposes within the
group.81 Therefore, freedom of association enables a person to join a group

73. Id. at 623.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., id. at 614.
77. See, e.g., id. at 615.
78. Id. at 622.
79. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (quoting Roberts
v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).
80. Contained within the freedom to associate is the category of expressive
association. Dale, 530 U.S. at 647–48. Expressive association allows a group to
include and exclude members based on the views and ideas that people within the
group seek to express. Id. A law requiring a group to include unwanted members
infringes upon the existing group members’ freedom of expressive association
when the additional, unwanted members impose a significant burden upon the
group’s expression of viewpoints or ideas. Id. at 648 (citing New York State Club
Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988)).
81. See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537,
548 (1987).
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so long as she does not substantially impose upon group goals or ideas,
but a group retains the right to exclude members to a limited degree.82
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale presents a freedom of association
challenge to New Jersey’s public accommodations law, which restricted
discrimination in groups based on sexuality.83 The Boy Scouts of America
is a private organization with the goal of promoting moral values to its
members.84 James Dale, a homosexual scoutmaster of the Boy Scouts, was
actively involved in promoting gay rights.85 The Boy Scouts revoked
Dale’s membership upon discovering his involvement in the LGBTQ
community.86 Dale filed a complaint that alleged the Boy Scouts violated
New Jersey’s public accommodations law by revoking his membership
because of his sexual orientation.87
The United States Supreme Court held that the New Jersey public
accommodations statute did not require the Boy Scouts to readmit Dale
because readmittance would materially infringe upon the group’s freedom
of expressive association.88 The Court stated that prohibiting
discrimination could be a compelling state interest that enables
infringement upon the freedom of association, but it indicated that this
infringement will only be allowed when its impairment upon expression
of ideas is not material.89 The Court determined that the Boy Scouts’
mission to promote values in young members, particularly through its
adult leadership, qualified as expressive activity, and forcing the Boy
Scouts to include Dale would materially impair the Boy Scouts’ group
goals.90 In particular, the Court stated that Dale’s readmission would
significantly interfere with the Boy Scouts’ official position of not
encouraging homosexual conduct.91 The Court held that New Jersey’s
public accommodations law, which restricted groups’ discrimination
82. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623; Dale, 530 U.S. at 658 (citing Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 572
(1995)).
83. Dale, 530 U.S. 640; Bagenstos, supra note 32, at 1208.
84. Dale, 530 U.S. at 644.
85. Id.
86. Id. Dale had earned the rank of Eagle Scout, one of the highest honors in
the Boy Scouts. Id. When he wrote to Monmouth Council Executive James Kay—
who revoked the membership—to question the revocation, Kay replied that the
Boy Scouts barred membership to homosexual people. Id. at 645.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 644.
89. Id. at 658.
90. Id. at 655–56.
91. Id.
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toward potential members’ sexuality, should not be applied because its
enforcement would materially impair the members’ expression of ideas as
protected by the freedom of association.92 In Dale, therefore, the Court
prioritized freedom of association over the state public accommodations
statute and properly excluded Dale from the group.93
The Dale decision demonstrates that freedom of association can
outweigh—or at least threaten—enforcement of a public accommodations
statute.94 If a public accommodations statute requires a group to accept an
unwelcome member, the statute may infringe upon the freedom to
associate.95 In these cases, a compelling state interest can override a
freedom of association violation when the infringement is not material.96
For example, in Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, the United States Supreme Court
recognized that “eradicating discrimination against [a state’s] female
citizens” served as a compelling state interest for infringing upon an allmale group’s freedom to associate.97 In particular, the Court emphasized
that application of the state public accommodations law would not impose
“any serious burdens” upon the group’s freedom of expressive
association.98 Thus, for a public accommodations statute to outweigh the
freedom to associate, the state must both demonstrate that the interest is
unrelated to suppression of the group’s ideas and that the state cannot
achieve the compelling interest in a less suppressive way.99 Freedom of
association thus acts as a hurdle over which both legislation and
application of public accommodations laws must leap.
In analyzing the expansive New Jersey public accommodations
statute, the Dale Court noted that the definition of public accommodations
has broadened over time through legislation, heightening the possibility of
infringing upon the First Amendment right to freedom of association.100 In
Louisiana, the drafters within 1973 Louisiana Constitutional Convention,
who formulated Louisiana’s public accommodations statute, also noticed

92. Id. at 644; Bagenstos, supra note 32, at 1208.
93. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 658–59.
94. Id. at 657–59; see Bagenstos, supra note 32, at 1208.
95. See Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of
the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 680 (2010).
96. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984); Dale, 530 U.S. at 647–
48.
97. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
98. Id. at 626.
99. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58–59 (1973); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
100. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656–57 (2000).
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the potential for Louisiana’s public accommodations law to infringe upon
freedom of association.101
II. LOUISIANA’S PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LEGISLATION
Louisiana’s public accommodations provision drew inspiration from
the Civil Rights Act.102 The Civil Rights Act states that “all persons” must
be provided “full and equal enjoyment” of services that a public
accommodation offers.103 Although the Civil Rights Act mentions that
public accommodations shall not discriminate based on “race, color,
religion, or national origin,”104 each jurisdiction’s respective statute or
ordinance lists its own protected classifications.105 The District of
Columbia, Seattle, and the U.S. Virgin Islands include political affiliation
as a protected class,106 but no state’s collection of protected classes lists
political affiliation,107 including Louisiana.108 The Louisiana Constitution
contains Louisiana’s public accommodations provision in article I, section
12.109
The Louisiana definition of public accommodations is set forth in the
Louisiana Revised Statutes. Section 51:2232(9) defines public
accommodations as any establishment that: (1) “supplies goods or services
to the general public”; (2) “solicits or accepts the patronage or trade of the
general public”; or (3) receives direct or indirect support from government
funds.110 The Louisiana Revised Statutes also provide examples of public
accommodations, including restaurants, hotels, and places of
entertainment.111 Housed in the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, section 12
provides the primary law governing discrimination in public
101. See Hargrave, supra note 8, at 40; VII RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Sept. 13–
14, 1973 at 1245–46.
102. RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973,
supra note 101, at 1245.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1964).
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. I, § 12; D.C. CODE ANN. STAT. § 2:1402.31
(2012); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 14:06.030(B)(5) (2015); V.I. CODE ANN.
§ 10:64(3) (2014).
106. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. STAT. § 2:1402.31; SEATTLE, WASH., MUN.
CODE § 14:06.030(B)(5); V.I. CODE ANN. § 10:64(3); Rao, supra note 5.
107. Rao, supra note 5.
108. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
109. Id.
110. LA. REV. STAT. § 51:2232(9) (2014).
111. Id. § 49:146(2) (1987).
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accommodations. The location of section 12 creates a unique opportunity
for Louisiana legislators to include political affiliation in future drafts of
Louisiana’s public accommodations law.
Section 12 is a short distance away from section 3, Louisiana’s equal
protection statute. The two sections share statutory language and certain
classifications; however, although Louisiana’s public accommodations
statute does not include political affiliation, its equal protection statute
explicitly protects political affiliation, creating a gap in the law.112 This
gap provides an opportunity to add political affiliation as a protected
classification from discrimination in Louisiana public accommodations
law. Political affiliates need explicit protection under public
accommodations law because the United States currently faces a political
climate in which a restaurant serving the public can ask even a prominent
national official to leave based on her political affiliation.113 Louisiana
legislators can address the current societal context by amending
Louisiana’s public accommodations statute to include political affiliation
as a protected classification. The comparisons between sections 3 and 12
bolster this approach.
A. The Framework: Sections 3 and 12 of the Louisiana Constitution
Article I, section 12 reads: “In access to public areas, accommodations,
and facilities, every person shall be free from discrimination based on race,
religion, or national ancestry and from arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable
discrimination based on age, sex, or physical condition.”114 Section 12 does
not offer protection to political affiliates.115
The equal protection statute in Louisiana’s Constitution, however,
does include political affiliation.116 Section 3 states:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law
shall discriminate against a person because of race or religious
ideas, beliefs, or affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously,
or unreasonably discriminate against a person because of birth,
age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or
affiliations. Slavery and involuntary servitude are prohibited,

112.
113.
note 5.
114.
115.
116.
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except in the latter case as punishment for crime.117
Louisiana thus offers some protection to political affiliation through its
equal protection statute.118 The mirrored language between sections 3 and
12 indicates a relationship between the sections upon which Louisiana
legislators may capitalize.119 Both sections’ intermediate standards of
review specifically prohibit arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable
discrimination.120 Additionally, under the intermediate standard of review,
both sections protect age, sex, and physical condition, but only section 3
lists political affiliation.121 Due to the paralleled language and
classifications, Louisiana legislators should amend section 12 to add
political affiliation under the intermediate standard of review. Although
the drafters did not initially include political affiliation in section 12, the
current social and political climate122 indicates a recent problem
highlighted by the Red Hen incident.123 The occurrence at the Red Hen
indicates a broader issue: Existing public accommodations laws124 allow
public establishments like restaurants to discriminate against potential
patrons based on political affiliation.125 Inclusion of political affiliation
under section 12’s intermediate standard of review enables Louisiana to
address this current social climate by curbing political affiliation
discrimination in public accommodations.
B. Standards of Review Under Sections 3 and 12
Comparing sections 3 and 12 reveals a gap that Louisiana legislators
should use to place political affiliation as a protected classification in the
public accommodations context of section 12.126 In particular, sections 3
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. See id. §§ 3, 12.
119. See id. §§ 3, 12.
120. See id. §§ 3, 12.
121. See id. § 3. Although section 3 also includes other classifications that are
not listed in section 12, the scope of this Comment is limited to only the
consideration of including political affiliation from section 3’s list in section 12.
122. See supra notes 1–5, 10–18 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Filloon, supra note 1; Selk & Murray, supra note 3; Rao, supra
note 5.
124. The exceptions include the District of Columbia, Seattle, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands public accommodations laws, which already cater to this problem.
See D.C. CODE ANN. STAT. § 2:1402.31 (2012); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE
§ 14:06.030(B)(5) (2015); V.I. CODE ANN. § 10:64(3) (2014).
125. See supra notes 1–5, 10–18 and accompanying text.
126. See generally LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 12.
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and 12 share similar standards of review that address the sections’
respective protections.127 Under the shared language, discrimination based
on race or religion—and also national ancestry in section 12—faces an
absolute bar, the highest level of scrutiny.128 If a state law or public
accommodation discriminates against someone based on religion, for
example, a court would instantly find the law or accommodation in
violation of the related provision.129 Discrimination based on the other
articulated classes must not be “arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable,”
which is an intermediate level of scrutiny described in more detail
below.130 Age, sex, and physical condition appear in both sections as
protected classifications, and they are the only protected classifications in
section 12.131 Section 3, Louisiana’s equal protection statute, includes
additional classes under the intermediate standard of review, namely birth,
culture, and political ideas or affiliations.132 The background on section
3’s formation shows that sections 3 and 12 should be read in pari materia.
C. Section 3: Legislative Intent and Court Interpretations
The delegates to the Louisiana Constitutional Convention intended to
implement more safeguards in its equal protection statute than the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees by specifically enumerating the
classifications to which it granted equal protection, such as religious
belief, age, birth, and political affiliation.133 The Convention drafters
divided the section 3 classifications into two levels of scrutiny: strict and
intermediate.134 Article I, section 3 strictly prohibits discrimination based
on race or religion, and the other articulated classifications receive
intermediate scrutiny.135 The drafters intended to make the substance of
article I, section 3 more expansive than federal law.136
127. Hargrave, supra note 8, at 40; see LA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
128. See LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 12.
129. See Sibley v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 477 So. 2d 1094, 1107
(La. 1985).
130. LA. CONST. art. I, § 12; Hargrave, supra note 8, at 40; see also LA. CONST.
art. I, § 3.
131. LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 12.
132. Id. § 3.
133. Sibley v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 477 So. 2d 1094, 1108
(La. 1985); Louisiana Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. State ex rel. Div. of
Admin., Office of State Purchasing, 669 So. 2d 1185, 1198 (La. 1996).
134. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
135. Devlin, supra note 57, at 902–03; see LA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
136. Devlin, supra note 57, at 902.
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Initially, Louisiana courts utilized a three-tier system for its equal
protection analysis, modeled after federal case law, with a different level
of scrutiny at each tier.137 In 1985, the Louisiana Supreme Court departed
from the federal system in Sibley v. Board of Supervisors and formulated
a different equal protection test for the articulated classifications other than
race or religion: whether the governmental action at issue promotes a
suitable and legitimate state purpose, which the state must identify.138 The
court found that the distinguishing factor among the three standards of
review was the application of the burden of proof.139 With its approach,
the court determined that when a plaintiff shows that a statute
discriminated against her based on race or religion, that law shall be
instantly declared unconstitutional.140 If the plaintiff cites a section 3
classification other than race or religion, the burden shifts to the
government to prove a legitimate state purpose for the law or show that
the discrimination was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.141
Finally, if the plaintiff argues that a government actor discriminated
against her under a category not included in section 3, she bears the burden
of proving that the government action discriminating against a
“disadvantaged class” did not further a legitimate state purpose.142 Thus,
in Sibley, the Louisiana Supreme Court articulated a burden-shifting test
for the section 3 equal protection analysis.143
Sibley endures as the primary authority regarding the approach to
section 3 cases.144 As section 3 and section 12 share the same standards for
review, the question of whether to apply the Sibley standard to section 12
remained. In 2004, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered whether to
137. Id. at 902–03.
138. Sibley, 477 So. 2d at 1104, 1107–09; Devlin, supra note 57, at 903–04.
139. Sibley, 477 So. 2d at 1107–09; Devlin, supra note 57, at 904.
140. Sibley, 477 So. 2d at 1107; Devlin, supra note 57, at 904–05. Devlin noted
that this statement was dictum in Sibley. But see Louisiana Associated Gen.
Contractors, Inc. v. State ex rel. Div. of Admin., Office of State Purchasing, 669
So. 2d 1185, 1198 (La. 1996) (specifically holding that when a law discriminates
based on race, it “shall be repudiated completely, regardless of the justification
behind the racial discrimination”).
141. Sibley, 477 So. 2d at 1107; Devlin, supra note 57, at 904.
142. Sibley, 477 So. 2d at 1107; Devlin, supra note 57, at 904.
143. Devlin, supra note 57, at 904.
144. See, e.g., Louisiana Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc., 669 So. 2d at
1196–98 (affirming Sibley’s delineation of the burden-shifting approach within
the three standards of review, as well as specifically holding that when a law
discriminates based on race, it “shall be repudiated completely, regardless of the
justification behind the racial discrimination”).
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apply the section 3 approach to section 12 in Albright v. Southern Trace
Country Club of Shreveport.145
D. Combining Section 3’s Standard of Review Interpretation with Section
12’s Application
In Albright, the Louisiana Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether the parallel language of “arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable”
in sections 3 and 12 should apply similarly.146 The defendant was a country
club that included a restaurant facility named the “Men’s Grille.”147 The
plaintiffs, who were female members of the country club, attempted to
dine at the Men’s Grille, which was the only restaurant facility open at the
time of their visit.148 Male employees, however, denied the plaintiffs
access, specifically stating that the plaintiffs were not allowed entry or
service at the Men’s Grille because they were women.149 The plaintiffs
sought equal access to the Men’s Grille regardless of gender.150
The court found that section 12 governed this case because it is
“directed toward those who would discriminate” and prohibits arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable discrimination on the basis of sex.151 The court
held that, first, the plaintiffs had the burden of proving a prima facie case,
by a preponderance of the evidence, of arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable discrimination under section 12.152 To establish a prima facie
case, the plaintiff must show: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected
class; (2) the establishment is a public accommodation; and (3) the public
accommodation discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of her
membership in the protected class.153 Once proven, the burden of proof
shifts to the defendant to provide a sufficient, non-discriminatory purpose
for its actions.154 Thus, the Albright test employs Sibley’s enumeration of
the intermediate standard of review as applied to section 3.155 The court

145. Albright v. Southern Trace Country Club of Shreveport, Inc., 879 So. 2d
121 (La. 2004).
146. Id. at 131–34.
147. Id. at 125.
148. Id. at 126.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 127.
152. Id. at 132–33.
153. Id. at 133.
154. Id. at 132–33.
155. Id. at 133–34.
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held that the plaintiffs satisfied their burden of proof.156 The defendant’s
justification for its discriminatory action—preference of the male club
members and the alleged ability to make more revenue based on the
discrimination itself—did not satisfy its burden of proof.157
The Albright court specifically noted that the analogy between
Sibley’s section 3 intermediate standard of review and similar language in
section 12 was the most appropriate course.158 In particular, the court chose
to adopt the Sibley approach because the section 12 language that prohibits
“arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable discrimination”159 was “obviously
patterned after”160 the section 3 language prohibiting laws from
“arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably” discriminating against a
protected class.161 Therefore, the Albright court utilized section 3 analysis
for a section 12 case, so the mirrored language of “arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable” discrimination for protected classifications should be
subject to the same analysis in both section 3 and section 12.162
Shared analyses between sections 3 and 12 align with the drafters’
intent for protection against arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable
discrimination.163 The drafters specifically voiced their intention for
increased protection in the equal protection context because their aim was
to expand the Fourteenth Amendment.164 The similar language between
the sections indicates the intent to also extend the same standard of
protection to section 12. Due to the legislative intent embodied in the
drafters’ linguistic choices, today’s Louisiana legislators should amend
section 12 to also include political affiliation, which would make the two
sections even more parallel. An amendment to section 12 that includes
political affiliation would protect political affiliates from discrimination
not only in the equal protection context, but also within public
accommodations. Without such an amendment, arbitrary, capricious, and
unreasonable discrimination against political affiliates may continue in
Louisiana public accommodations.
156. Id. at 135.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 132–34.
159. LA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
160. Albright, 879 So. 2d at 133.
161. LA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
162. Albright, 879 So. 2d at 133.
163. See Sibley v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 477 So. 2d 1094, 1108
(La. 1985); LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 12.
164. See Sibley, 477 So. 2d at 1108; Louisiana Associated Gen. Contractors,
Inc. v. State ex rel. Div. of Admin., Office of State Purchasing, 669 So. 2d 1185,
1198 (La. 1996).
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III. THE ADDITION OF POLITICAL AFFILIATION IN LIGHT OF DRAFTING
HISTORY AND OTHER LEGISLATION
The drafting history of section 12, along with a comparison to
language in other legislation,165 indicates the Louisiana Legislature’s
ability to add political affiliation under the intermediate standard of
review.
A. Characteristics of Political Affiliation and Louisiana Constitutional
Convention’s Intent Reveal Potential to Add Political Affiliation
Section 12 explicitly bars discrimination based on race, religion, and
national ancestry, and three additional classifications are subject to an
intermediate standard of review: age, sex, and physical condition.166 In the
legislative history of section 12, the drafters acknowledged that the
Louisiana Legislature can make certain “distinctions,” or classifications,
in public accommodations law.167 The ability of the Louisiana Legislature
to recognize classifications subject to discrimination168 implies that it may
acknowledge additional classifications in the future. Unprotected
classifications currently subject to unfettered discrimination in Louisiana
public accommodations, such as political affiliates, are poised for
legislative recognition through a constitutional amendment or revised
statute.
Political affiliation is admittedly different from the other
classifications subject to section 12 intermediate scrutiny—age, sex, and
physical condition—because political affiliation is a choice, not an
immutable characteristic. The choice to belong to a certain political
affiliation, however, is more limited, more calculated, and more
significant than typical, daily decisions.169 For example, political
affiliation is not akin to choosing which article of clothing one may
purchase. At a store, numerous options for clothing exist, and the decision
is most often made within the day, if not within minutes. Some people may
skim a few reviews online if the purchase is substantial, but most people
165. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. STAT. § 2:1402.31 (2012); SEATTLE, WASH.,
MUN. CODE § 14:06.030(B)(5) (2015); V.I. CODE ANN. § 10:64(3) (2014).
166. LA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
167. RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973,
supra note 101, at 1244.
168. Id.
169. See Switching Parties in Trump’s America, ECONOMIST (Oct. 20, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/united-states/2018/10/20/switching-parties-in-trumpsamerica [https://perma.cc/JH8V-MBUQ].
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will not educate themselves before purchasing. A piece of clothing is
rarely worn daily; one dons a different outfit every day, in some rotation.
To the contrary, although both can be characterized as choices that one
makes, political affiliation is not so easily shed or changeable as
clothing.170 Instead of arbitrarily or compulsively choosing one’s political
affiliation, people can educate themselves by discussing politics with
peers, watching debates and the news, and comparing candidates. Political
groups are limited in number171 compared to the multitudes of clothes
housed within a shopping mall. Additionally, once deciding their political
viewpoints, people are typically loath to switch their ideologies,172 and
people often identify themselves based on their political ties.173 Therefore,
although political affiliation is not as inflexible as age, sex, or physical
condition, it should still be included in section 12 because it is a calculated,
significant choice that many integrate into their identities.
Additionally, in modern society, physical condition and sex are not as
permanent as they were generally considered in 1974, the date of the
Louisiana Constitution. Technology and surgical abilities have
advanced—brain-controlled exoskeletons can enable quadriplegic people
to walk,174 and surgeons can perform sex reassignment surgery. Thus, two
of the three categories subject to section 12 intermediate scrutiny are not
as immutable as they once were. Admittedly, acquiring such advanced
technology or engaging in any surgical procedure requires a more
significant undertaking than changing one’s political affiliation. Although
political affiliation remains more changeable than sex and physical
condition, when legislators today superimpose modern ideologies upon
170. See id.
171. See Kristin Eberhard, The United States Needs More than Two Political
Parties: Sanders and Trump Show American Voters Want More Options,
SIGHTLINE INST. (April 28, 2016 at 6:30 AM), https://www.sightline.org/2016/
04/28/the-united-states-needs-more-than-two-political-parties/ [https://perma.cc/
2S9K-Y43L] (arguing that more parties should be involved in the American
voting system because, although “[t]wo parties can adequately represent people’s
views along a single axis,” “views [actually] bifurcate along two different axes,”
meaning that “two parties cannot reflect the diversity of political views.”) For
now, however, Americans tend to either consider themselves as Democrat or
Republican, or, alternatively, as independent. Id.
172. See Switching Parties in Trump’s America, supra note 169.
173. See generally Switching Parties in Trump’s America, supra note 169.
174. James Gallagher, Paralysed Man Moves in Mind-Reading Exoskeleton,
BBC NEWS (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/health-49907356
[https://perma.cc/PBA3-CP6C] (nothing that this device enables walking
movement but must still be attached to a harness that hangs from the ceiling of a
laboratory).
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section 12, political affiliation seems more at home under the intermediate
standard than it may have in 1974 because it is also incorporated into one’s
identity such that it presents a significant undertaking to change.
Not only does political affiliation correspond with the other
intermediate section 12 classifications, but also the comparison between
sections 3 and 12 enables the addition of political affiliation to section
12.175 Age, sex, and physical condition appear as protected classifications
in both sections and are the sole protected classifications under
intermediate scrutiny in section 12.176 Section 3 includes additional
classifications within its intermediate level: birth, culture, and political
affiliation.177 The drafters of section 3 noted that they specifically
articulated categories for increased protection because they “fe[lt] very
strongly about” the classes and found that the classes “need[ed] to be given
some addressing to.”178 Additionally, the drafters of section 12 recognized
the Louisiana Legislature may, in the future, add to the intermediate
section 12 category.179 Today, the Louisiana Legislature may add political
affiliation to section 12 for the same reason it was included in section 3: It
has become a classification that now needs additional protection. The
parallel standard of review, in addition to the three mirrored classes,
encourages a redraft of section 12. Adding political affiliation as a
protected classification aligns with the Louisiana Constitutional
Convention’s acknowledgment that certain classes that face
discrimination should receive additional protection.180 The inclusion of
political affiliation would also correspond with the Convention’s related
intent for increased protection toward the section 3 classifications, which
already include political affiliation.181
The drafters specifically chose the classifications in section 3 to
concretely establish protection against discrimination based on the
articulated classifications.182 Similar to section 3, section 12 specifically
protects certain classifications that typically face discrimination.183
175. See LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 12.
176. Id.
177. Id. § 3.
178. VI RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973,
supra note 101, Aug. 29, 1973, at 1017.
179. VII id. at 1244; see LA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
180. Id.
181. See Sibley v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 477 So. 2d 1094, 1108
(La. 1985).
182. Hargrave, supra note 8, at 7 (citing VI RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973, Aug. 29, 1973).
183. Id.
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Recognition of particular classes implies that the list of protected
classifications can be subject to additions that may arise later due to social
or cultural change.184 The Louisiana Legislature should add political
affiliation as a protected classification under section 12 because unfettered
discrimination against political affiliates can currently occur.185 Today,
public accommodations can arbitrarily refuse service based on a patron’s
political ties, and if the altercation even reaches the courts, intermediate
scrutiny cannot be applied.186 Protecting political affiliation in public
accommodations laws is not foreign to the United States: The District of
Columbia, Seattle, and the U.S. Virgin Islands already do so.187
B. Public Accommodations Legislation in the District of Columbia,
Seattle, and the U.S. Virgin Islands
The public accommodations legislation in the District of Columbia,
Seattle, and the U.S. Virgin Islands demonstrates that political affiliation
is a protected classification in other jurisdictions.188 Inclusion of political
affiliation in other statutes indicates that political affiliation can be treated
as akin to sex and other classifications already housed in section 12’s
intermediate category.189 In a subsection of its Human Rights Law that
deals specifically with public accommodations, the District of Columbia
prohibits discrimination for 18 classifications, already a drastic difference
from Louisiana.190 In its limited legislative history, the articulated intent
for including so many categories was to halt “discrimination for any reason
other than that of individual merit,” which included the articulated
classifications but was not limited to them.191 The District of Columbia
law defines political affiliation as “the state of belonging to or endorsing
any political party,”192 and the statute has included political affiliation
184. See RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
1973, supra note 101, at 1245.
185. See, e.g., supra notes 1–5, 10–18 and accompanying text.
186. See generally LA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
187. See D.C. CODE ANN. STAT. § 2:1402.31 (2012); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN.
CODE § 14:06.030(B)(5) (2015); V.I. CODE ANN. § 10:64(3) (2014).
188. See D.C. CODE ANN. STAT. § 2:1402.31; SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE
§ 14:06.030(B)(5); V.I. CODE ANN. § 10:64(3). The District of Columbia
legislation has more legislative history than Seattle or the Virgin Islands. See D.C.
CODE ANN. STAT. § 2:1402.31.
189. See generally LA. CONST. art. I, § 12; D.C. CODE ANN. STAT. § 2:1402.31;
SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 14:06.030(B)(5); V.I. CODE ANN. § 10:64(3).
190. D.C. CODE ANN. STAT. § 2:1402.31.
191. 24 D.C. REG. NO. 1, 5 (July 1, 1977).
192. D.C. CODE ANN. STAT. § 2:1401.02(25) (2010).
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since its adoption in 1977.193 The broad nature of the District of Columbia
public accommodations statute is not exclusive to the nation’s capital,
however.
Across the country, Seattle has also adopted broad protection against
discrimination based on political affiliation.194 Like the District of
Columbia, Seattle’s public accommodations legislation also protects 18
classifications.195 The ordinance refers to “political ideology,” which it
defines as any belief or idea connected to a political group, including
membership in a political party.196 The definition also includes acts related
to political beliefs, so long as the actions do not cause significant
disruption of the public accommodation provider’s property rights.197 In
addition, the Seattle ordinance prohibits “harass[ment], intimidat[ion], or
otherwise abusing any person,” the person’s friends, or the person’s
associations in public accommodations based on their political
ideologies.198 Thus, Seattle and the District of Columbia contain similar
public accommodations restrictions toward discrimination based on
political affiliation.199 Beyond the continental United States, the public
accommodations law in the Virgin Islands is written similarly to the
Seattle and District of Columbia laws.200
The U.S. Virgin Islands prohibits discrimination within its public
accommodations law based on eight categories, including political
affiliation.201 The U.S. Virgin Islands Code does not define most of its
terms within its civil rights title,202 but its public accommodations law is
written similarly to the District of Columbia and Seattle provisions,
indicating that the Virgin Islands’ public accommodations law likely
functions similarly.203
Each of these three jurisdictions’ public accommodations legislation
contains different definitions; however, the common themes among the
193. Id. § 2:1402.31 (2012); 24 D.C. REG. NO. 16, 2830, 2838, 2848–49 (Oct.
14, 1977).
194. See D.C. CODE ANN. STAT. § 2:1402.31 (2012); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN.
CODE § 14:06.030(B)(5) (2015).
195. See SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 14:06.030(B)(5).
196. Id. § 14:06.020(V) (2018).
197. Id.
198. Id. § 14:06.030(B)(5) (2015).
199. See id.
200. See V.I. CODE ANN. § 10:64(3) (2014).
201. Id.
202. See id. § 10:2 (1961).
203. See id. § 10:64(3) (2014); D.C. CODE ANN. STAT. § 2:1402.31 (2012);
SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 14:06.030(B)(5).
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three jurisdictions are the larger numbers of protected grounds and the
inclusion of political affiliation.204 Seattle and the District of Columbia
protect 18 classifications each,205 and the U.S. Virgin Islands protects
eight.206 These numbers alone demonstrate more inclusion in granted
protections in other jurisdictions compared to Louisiana’s six
classifications.207 The above legislation illustrates that public
accommodations laws can include political affiliation as a protected
class.208 The Louisiana Legislature should take a proactive step toward
more protective public accommodations law by adding political affiliation
to section 12 or by creating a new revised statute to bar arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable discrimination toward political affiliates in
public accommodations. Currently, the Louisiana Revised Statutes already
provide some protection for political affiliation within the employment
law context.209
C. Political Affiliation in Louisiana Employment Law
In addition to section 3 equal protection, Louisiana employment law
includes protection for political affiliates.210 Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 23:961 prohibits employers from directing or influencing employees’
political affiliations.211 The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal held
in 1981 that firing an employee based on the employee’s status as a
political candidate violated Revised Statutes § 23:961, despite the fact that
the employee’s candidacy could detrimentally affect the defendant
employer’s business.212 Additionally, Louisiana Revised Statutes § 23:962
204. See D.C. CODE ANN. STAT. § 2:1402.31; SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE
§ 14:06.030(B)(5); V.I. CODE ANN. § 10:64(3).
205. D.C. CODE ANN. STAT. § 2:1402.31; SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE
§ 14:06.030(B)(5).
206. V.I. CODE ANN. § 10:64(3).
207. LA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
208. See D.C. CODE ANN. STAT. § 2:1401.02(24) (2010); SEATTLE, WASH.,
MUN. CODE § 14:06.020(U) (2018); V.I. CODE ANN. § 10:2 (1961).
209. See LA. REV. STAT. § 23:961 (2018); id. § 23:962.
210. See LA. REV. STAT. § 23:961 (2018); id. § 23:962.
211. Id. § 23:961.
212. Davis v. Louisiana Computing Corp., 394 So. 2d 678, 679 (La. Ct. App.
4th Cir. 1981). A substantial portion of the employer’s business relied on
negotiations with Jefferson Parish, the Jefferson Parish School Board, and other
governmental agencies within the parish. The plaintiff became a candidate for
Kenner City Council, in opposition to another candidate supported by officials
within Jefferson Parish. In other cases in which the plaintiffs cite Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 23:961, plaintiffs have been less successful. See Peacock v.
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prohibits employers of laborers from discharging their employees because
of their political opinions.213 Louisiana employment law demonstrates that
some prohibition of discrimination based on political affiliation is already
in place.214 Few cases examine Revised Statutes §§ 23:961 or 23:962, but
their inclusion of political affiliation nonetheless indicates that Louisiana
can add protection of political affiliation in other areas of legislation,
including public accommodations law.215
Two contexts in Louisiana law already protect political affiliation:
employment law and section 3.216 Thus, adding political affiliation as a
protected classification in section 12 is not unprecedented because
Louisiana legislators have already included political affiliation within
other contexts.217 The addition to section 12 would correspond with the
drafters’ intent for increased protections toward political affiliation as a
class, which can be derived from the sheer inclusion of political affiliation
in article I, section 3; Revised Statutes § 23:961; and Revised Statutes
§ 23:962.218 Section 12 deserves an amendment to include political
affiliation within its intermediate level of protection. Notably, however,
the addition of political affiliation must overcome an obstacle borne by the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution: freedom of
association.
IV. POTENTIAL CONFLICT WITH FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
Public accommodations regulations harbor the potential to infringe
upon the freedom to associate, particularly if the public accommodations
statute forces a group to accept an unwelcome member.219 The definition
of public accommodations has broadened over time and through
West Carroll Parish Police Jury, 454 So. 2d 1253 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1984). The
decisions that reject plaintiffs’ § 23:961 contentions, however, usually hinge on
the employment relationship or lack thereof. See Finkelstein v. Barthelemy, 565
So. 2d 1098 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1990); Boyer v. St. Amant, 364 So. 2d 1338
(La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
213. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:962.
214. See id. §§ 23:961, 23:962.
215. See id.
216. LA. CONST. art. I, § 3; LA. REV. STAT. § 23:961; id. § 23:962.
217. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 3; LA. REV. STAT. § 23:961; id. § 23:962.
218. See generally LA. CONST. art. I, § 3; LA. REV. STAT. § 23:961; id.
§ 23:962.
219. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 657 (2000); see Christian Legal
Soc. Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S.
661, 680 (2010); see Bagenstos, supra note 32, at 1208.
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legislation, and the possibility of infringing upon the First Amendment
freedom of association has grown simultaneously.220
A. Freedom of Association Within Section 12’s Constitutional History
The 1973 Louisiana Constitutional Convention members considered
the tensions between public accommodations laws and freedom of
association.221 The committee proposal containing section 12 as it now
stands initially included an additional sentence that addressed freedom of
association, but the drafters later removed this sentence.222 Further,
directly after the adoption of section 12, two Convention members
proposed amendments to section 12 that would add language barring
infringement upon freedom of association, but the Convention also
rejected both attempts.223
Both amendments to section 12 garnered debate before rejection.224
Delegate Gravel, who proposed section 12 as it is today, opposed the first
freedom of association amendment, reasoning that the addition might
contradict and limit section 12 by potentially allowing public
accommodations to exclude patrons.225 The Convention rejected the first
amendment with a 53 to 50 vote.226 The debate regarding the second
220. Dale, 530 U.S. at 657.
221. See RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
1973, supra note 101, at 1245–46, 1255–56.
222. The additional sentence read: “Nothing herein shall be construed to
impair freedom of association.” Albright v. Southern Trace Country Club of
Shreveport, Inc., 879 So. 2d 121, 127 (La. 2004) (quoting Hargrave, supra note
8, at 37). Much debate surrounded the proposals for section 12, and some
delegates wanted to extend section 12 further to also regulate private individuals.
Hargrave, supra note 8, at 37. The initial proposal contained language preventing
private discrimination in property sales or rentals. Id. at 38. The Convention soon
deleted the property provision with substantial dissent. Id. The committee then
withdrew its initial proposal and submitted a compromise provision. Id. The
freedom of association language, which the committee removed before section 12
passed, was part of the compromise provision. Id. at 40.
223. A. Jackson suggested the first amendment, proposing that section 12
should include an additional sentence, which would have stated: “[N]othing
herein shall be construed to impair freedom of association.” Jenkins offered the
second proposal, which would have read: “No law shall impair the right of each
person to associate freely with others.” RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973, supra note 101, at 1245–46, 1255–56.
224. See id.
225. Id. at 1244, 1246.
226. Id. at 1246.
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proposal further defined freedom of association in the public
accommodations context of section 12.227 Jenkins, who proffered the
amendment, defined associational freedom as “the right of people to join
together in organizations, societies, and ventures” and to “make
interpersonal relations.”228 Jenkins distinguished the right to freedom of
association from the right of assembly, which Jenkins described as the
individual’s right to gather in particular places.229 The Convention,
however, rejected Jenkins’s proposal with a 59 to 53 vote.230 Thus, neither
amendment that attempted to include freedom of association became
law.231
The close votes indicate that the Convention was divided on whether
to consider freedom of association as a valid limit on the rights guaranteed
in section 12.232 Although Convention members refused to adopt the
associational freedom proposals, the close voting ratio and the recorded
debates imply that the Louisiana Convention members found some
importance in freedom of association.233 The Convention, however,
preferred to ensure curtailment of discrimination within public
accommodations for articulated classes.234
Notably, the Louisiana Constitution includes some indirect
connections to freedom of association.235 Article I, sections 7 and 9
implicitly address freedom of association by guaranteeing First
Amendment freedoms.236 Section 7 codifies the freedom of expression
through speech and the press.237 Section 9 addresses the right to peaceably
assemble and to petition the government for redress.238 These sections thus
indirectly include freedom of association, enabling a somewhat tenuous
associational freedom protection toward section 12.239 Additionally, prior
cases, such as Dale, ensure that claims under public accommodations laws
are subject to a freedom of association analysis.240
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
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Id. at 1255.
Id.
Id. at 1256.
See id. at 1246, 1256.
Id. at 1246, 1256.
See id. at 1244–46, 1255–56.
See id.
See LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 7, 9.
See id.
Id. § 7.
Id. § 9.
See id. §§ 7, 9.
See id. §§ 7, 9, 12; Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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B. Potential Threats to Freedom of Association by Public
Accommodations Laws
Expansion of public accommodations laws to include more
classifications can potentially threaten the freedom to associate, but adding
political affiliation in section 12 would not violate the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution.241 States violate individuals’ freedom to
associate when states infringe on individuals’ rights to choose with whom
they will participate in a joint political, religious, cultural, or other group
goal.242 States also infringe upon the freedom of association when states
force groups to include members who they would have otherwise
excluded.243 Adding political affiliation to section 12 could potentially
infringe on First Amendment associational freedom by forcing political
groups to comingle in places of public accommodation. Existing Louisiana
and federal legislation and case law, however, ensure that the addition will
be subject to freedom of association analysis before section 12 would grant
protection to a plaintiff who claims political affiliation discrimination in a
public accommodation.244
If the application of a public accommodations statute infringes upon
the freedom of association, the courts should only uphold the action if the
compelling state interest of prohibiting discrimination of the articulated
classification does not materially impair the freedom of association.245 By
adding political affiliation to section 12, the Louisiana Legislature would
indicate a state interest to protect political affiliates from discrimination in
public accommodations.246 Material impairment of a group’s exchange of
ideas, however, will outweigh prohibition of discrimination based on
political affiliation in public accommodations.247 Incidents like the Red
Hen’s discrimination against the White House Press Secretary based on
her political ties248 demonstrate an overall problem that anyone in the
United States may face and that can otherwise pass unaddressed.249 Thus,
241. See Gottry, supra note 31, at 968.
242. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 616, 622 (1984).
243. Id. at 623; see also Dale, 530 U.S. at 648.
244. See Bagenstos, supra note 32, at 1208; Dale, 530 U.S. 640; LA. CONST.
art. I, §§ 7, 9.
245. Dale, 530 U.S. at 647–48.
246. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos.,
515 U.S. 557, 572 (1995).
247. Dale, 530 U.S. at 647–48.
248. See, e.g., Filloon, supra note 1; Selk and Murray, supra note 3; Rao, supra
note 5.
249. See supra notes 10–18 and accompanying text.

344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd 332

8/17/20 7:19 AM

2020]

COMMENT

989

Louisiana legislators should amend section 12 to include political
affiliation as a protected class or create a new revised statute to protect
political affiliates from discrimination in public accommodations.
V. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS: AMEND SECTION 12 OR DRAFT A NEW
LOUISIANA REVISED STATUTE
Due to the Louisiana Constitutional Convention history,250 as well as
similarities between sections 3 and 12, Louisiana legislators should add
political affiliation to the public accommodations law.251 The drafters of
the 1974 Louisiana Constitution noted that the Louisiana Legislature holds
the ability to recognize classifications that need additional protection
under the public accommodations law.252 The Red Hen incident presented
a national example of current societal divisiveness that has drawn political
lines, illustrating that political affiliates are subject to discrimination in
places of public accommodation.253 The parallels and gaps in article I,
sections 3 and 12 enable the inclusion of political affiliation in Louisiana’s
public accommodations statute.254 Additionally, although not typically
applied in courts, some Louisiana employment laws already offer political
affiliates protection.255 As a significant, infrequently changed choice,
political affiliation is sufficiently close to sex and physical condition,
which section 12 already protects under intermediate scrutiny. Louisiana
should therefore follow the lead of the District of Columbia, Seattle, and
the U.S. Virgin Islands and grant political affiliation protection within
public accommodations, becoming the first state to do so.256 The amended
public accommodations law would only restrict public businesses from
discriminating based on a patron’s political views if the business’s
discrimination against the patron were arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable, as determined by the courts.257

250. See RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
1973, supra note 101, at 1244–46, 1255–56.
251. See LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 12.
252. RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973,
supra note 101, at 1244.
253. See supra notes 1–5, 10–18 and accompanying text.
254. See LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 12.
255. See LA. REV. STAT. § 23:961 (2018); id. § 23:962.
256. See, D.C. CODE ANN. STAT. § 2:1402.31 (2012); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN.
CODE § 14:06.030(B)(5) (2015); V.I. CODE ANN. § 10:64(3) (2014).
257. See Albright v. Southern Trace Country Club of Shreveport, Inc., 879 So.
2d 121, 133 (La. 2004); LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 12.
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The Louisiana Legislature has two options. First, it can propose a
constitutional amendment that would add political affiliation as a
protected classification in section 12, next to age, sex, and physical
condition, under the intermediate standard. A constitutional amendment
would be ideal because it would place political affiliation protection in the
same location as the other classes under intermediate scrutiny.
The second solution would be to draft a new revised statute that
extends protection to political affiliation in public accommodations. The
new revised statute would mirror section 12’s language,258 reading: “In
access to public areas, accommodations, and facilities, every person shall
be free from arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable discrimination based
on political affiliation.”
Each of these solutions contains its own advantages and
disadvantages. Procedurally, an amendment to the Louisiana Constitution
requires a more arduous procedure than creating a new Louisiana Revised
Statute.259 To pass a constitutional amendment, the Louisiana Legislature
must first introduce the amendment through a joint resolution during a
legislative session, and two-thirds of each house in the legislature must
vote in favor of the joint resolution.260 Then, the proposed amendment
would be submitted to a statewide election, and it must receive a majority
vote to pass.261 Comparatively, a proposed revised statute only needs a
majority vote from each house of the Louisiana Legislature and need not
go through a statewide election.262
The constitutional amendment, however, presents the more
straightforward approach, even though it would be procedurally more
difficult to pass. If successful, the amendment would place protection for
political affiliates within the current section 12 classifications subject to
the intermediate standard of review.263 The addition of political affiliation
protection would be clear by placing it within the existing section 12
language; no plaintiff or court would need to address a new and separate
revised statute.
The Louisiana Legislature should therefore amend section 12 to
include political affiliation under the intermediate standard of review. The
constitutional amendment would address a current social and political
climate exemplified by incidents like that at the Red Hen.264 Without a
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
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legislative response, discrimination against people based on their political
affiliation can continue with only a low standard of review. Louisiana has
the opportunity to become the first state to address this problem.
CONCLUSION
The Louisiana Constitution allows the expansion of Louisiana’s
current anti-discrimination public accommodations legislation to add
political affiliation as a protected classification.265 The addition of political
affiliation must not infringe upon the right of freedom to associate, but
case law and other constitutional provisions incorporate the freedom of
association concern.266 In light of the recent societal context,267 the
Louisiana Legislature should add political affiliation to the list of protected
classes in public accommodations legislation. Louisiana legislators should
follow the District of Columbia, Seattle, and the U.S. Virgin Islands268 and
extend the protection of political affiliation to its public accommodations
legislation through a constitutional amendment.

265. See generally LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 12.
266. See id. §§ 7, 9, 12; Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
267. See supra notes 1–5, 10–18 and accompanying text.
268. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. STAT. § 2:1402.31 (2012); SEATTLE, WASH.,
MUN. CODE § 14:06.030(B)(5) (2015); V.I. CODE ANN. § 10:64(3) (2014).
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